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Postmodern Intimations: Musing on Invisibility: William
Faulkner, Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison
PHILIP WEINSTEIN
In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema.
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—FRANTZ FANON
Three modern novelists of race relations: what in their work begins to appear—within our
contemporary optic—as implicitly postmodern? How does their representation of the
“invisible” racial subject intersect with a later postmodernism’s more wholesale
deconstruction of the subject? That is my question, and—since I plan to be critical myself—it
may be best to begin on a cautionary note. Critics invested in postmodernism can be
remarkably simpleminded about modernism. Their most strident remarks often have a déjà-vu
quality, indicting modernism with the very naivetes that modernism used (a generation earlier)
to indict realism: the centered subject, a foundational project, claims of disinterestedness and
universality. Since this lazyminded approach to modernism drives me crazy, I need to be
careful not to oversimplify postmodernism in the same ways.1 For postmodern fiction has
evolved in numerous directions, making a unified field theory impossible. How could the same
characterizations have a purchase on textual worlds as different as Barthelme’s parodic games,
Italo Calvino’s self-generating narratives, Gabriel García-Márquez’s magic realism, and Toni
Morrison’s brooding reframing of American history?2
In what follows, the postmodernist generalizations I shall offer refer mainly to the brilliant,
brittle American fictions of the ’60s and ’70s—typically white-male authored, self-reflexive,
terminally playful. Its practitioners include Donald Barthelme, John Hawkes, Robert Coover,
and John Barth; its philosophers include Roland Barthes, Jean-François Lyotard, Jean
Baudrillard, and Richard Rorty; its commentators include Brian McHale and Linda Hutcheon.
(These names, I know, hardly make up a school, but they do suggest some familial contours.)
Rather than trying to say that such-and-such is postmodernism (a fruitless endeavor), I am
talking about some of its salient tendencies. A penchant for the performance of roles rather than
genuine identity, an insistence on parody, a conviction that texts cannot access the real but
derive from and rewrite other texts, a suspicion about master narratives and a consequent
leaning toward the “local,” a Nietzchean preference for play/construction rather than
truth/correspondence, a recurrence to pragmatic terms like “conversation,” “utility,” and
“pleasure,” a pervasive anxiety that the global spread of technological capitalism has erased
the very meaning of “the individual” and that amnesiac/schizophrenic flight represents one of
the few options still remaining: these are the stances I have in mind and that operate, in
miniature, in Barthelme’s minimalist definition of the “sentence”: the sentence is “a manmade
object, not the one we wanted of course, but still a construction of man, a structure to be
treasured for its weakness, as opposed to the strength of stones.”3 Barthelme’s postmodern
“sentence” rebukes an earlier time’s more ambitious sentence: play-artifice rather than truthcorrespondence, language’s weakness rather than its strength, a tone of wry acceptance of
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irreducible linguistic conditions rather than a raging desire to overcome them and somehow
speak the real itself. These orientations radiate out of that little “sentence” and serve as context
for the following argument about Faulkner, Wright, and Ellison.
I want to launch this musing on postmodern Yoknapatawpha, however, by citing a fourth
novelist from the that postmodernist group identified above, John Barth. Before moving into the
arena of borderline postmodern practices—as glimpsed in Faulkner, Wright, and Ellison—let’s
start with the real thing (slipping past postmodernism’s horror at the notion of any “real
thing”). Barth opens his 1958 novel The End of the Road with these arresting words, “In a
sense, I am Jacob Horner.”4 In a sense only. Here we have a salient version of the postmodern
subject: a fictional role I perform, a linguistic phrase that stands in for me (who I would be if
my name really identified me). This sentence hooked me when I read it years ago, and even
more the funny/terrible moment when putative Jacob Horner talks Rennie Morgan into
eavesdropping on her dignified, all-American-type husband Joe. Rennie demurs: “Real people
aren’t any different when they’re alone…. What you see of them is authentic.” To this Horner
replies: “Horseshit. Nobody’s authentic. Let’s look” (67). What they see is Joe Morgan in front
of the mirror antically practicing the military moves that support his all-American mask, then
rushing back to his writing desk, “his tongue gripped purposefully between his lips at the side
of his mouth … masturbating and picking his nose at the same time. I believe he also hummed a
sprightly tune in rhythm with his work” (70–1).
Musing on invisibility: for postmodern Barth identity is pure mask. The chasm between the
role-playing self visibly performed in public and the incoherent self invisibly enacted in
private is breathtaking, scandalous. This chasm between visible and invisible invalidates the
very concept of authenticity: a state in which concealed and revealed would both refer to an
essential core. As the sinister “Doctor” in Barth’s novel explains to Jacob Horner, identity has
nothing to do with essence but is rather a matter of visibly asserted masks, “Don’t think there’s
anything behind them: ego means I, and I means ego, and the ego by definition is a mask…. If
you sometimes have the feeling that your mask is insincere—impossible word!—it’s only
because one of your masks is incompatible with another” (90). Behind the mask, beneath the
role, deeper than the language that proclaims it, there is—nothing: a nothing that passes itself
off as a something. As Baudrillard writes, “To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one
has,” whereas “to simulate is to feign to have what one hasn’t.”5 Dissimulation is a staple of
Western narratives—what the Victorians comfortably called hypocrisy, a fullness of motive
seeking to conceal itself but always outed by the end of a Victorian novel: Uriah Heep in a
hundred different incarnations populates reassuringly the vast stage of Victorian fiction.
Simulation, however, is postmodern. Identity in Barth’s The End of the Road is a simulation,
not a mask hypocritically concealing an essence but a mask deceptively standing in for a void.
It’s an exhilarating idea.
For Faulkner’s Joe Christmas, however, it is an unbearable idea, generating unassuageable
nausea. Being no one—lacking essential identity, empty at the core—is worse by far than
having to be black: “‘I aint a nigger’ [little Joe Christmas says to the black man working at the
orphan yard] and the nigger says ‘You are worse than that. You don’t know what you are. And
more than that, you wont never know. You’ll live and you’ll die and you won’t never know.’”6
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It is desperate in Faulkner not to know who we are—who our parents are, what our culture is,
what racial, gender, and classed narratives have been internalized and shaped our identity.
These arrangements have fundamentally formed and deformed us, prior to consent and at a
level beneath consciousness. It is not possible in Faulkner to lack deep identity, although it is
recurrent to suffer—often fatally—from conflicting forms of identity that have been willy-nilly
“installed” within us. “Memory believes before knowing remembers”: Joe Christmas’s entire
life exhibits a stunning unconscious consistency. The crisis-moments Faulkner chooses to
narrate Joe’s becoming accumulate to produce not a simulated selfhood masking emptiness but
an overfilled identity—intolerably coherent, however decentered—that must in the course of
time erupt. His modernist invisibility has little in common with that of John Barth’s postmodern
characters. Seen or not seen, Christmas is, unfortunately, culturally marked to the core, doomed
to be who he is.
To situate Faulknerian invisibility further and then move from it to the different kinds of
invisibility operative in Wright and Ellison, I want first to backtrack to Dostoevsky. Whatever
else they are doing, all three later writers are engaged in revising Dostoevsky, for Notes from
Underground gives us Western literature’s first invisible man. A low-grade Russian civil
servant, Dostoevsky’s underground man tortures himself by walking up and down Nevsky
Prospect in St. Petersburg: invisible. He spends years seeking revenge for the insult of being,
precisely, ignored. (An officer had ignored him by removing him bodily from the edge of a
billiards table without noticing him). Ignored by others, he is also incoherent to himself: “And
now I am living out my life in my corner, taunting myself with the spiteful … consolation that it
is even impossible for an intelligent man seriously to become anything … only fools become
something.”7 The two states seem inseparable yet incompatible: on the one hand, to be
coherent for oneself (to be anything) involves being coherent for some others, i.e.,
recognizable to them. On the other hand, he passionately rejects all the terms for
recognizability that his culture offers him: “only fools become something.”
It is not so much that he is invisible as that he does not count: the forms of visible identity
available to him are in the eyes of others socially demeaning and in his own eyes ideologically
repellent. What he looks like is a failed petty bureaucrat, yet one who fiercely opposes that
humiliating take upon him. Repudiate as he might St. Petersburg’s official codes for selfmaking, he is alienated from any more traditional resources and is incapable of piecing
together a viable identity of his own. He thus remains cravenly dependent for his self-esteem
upon the very ones he scorns and who in turn scorn him.8 “I’ll show them” is the motto of the
resentful misfit who cannot rise to conceptual rebellion and exit from the game altogether. His
“refusal to accept a definition of himself … in terms imposed by the alien world of European
culture” avails him nothing.9 Dostoevsky pursues this plight of an overly intelligent man who
will not be a disempowered functionary, yet who remains ensnarled within a bureaucratized
social system that has dispossessed him of all native resources for self-making. In this text he
goes underground, but by the following year Dostoevsky has found his way into the more
sinister form of revenge such unharnessed and resentful energy must eventually take: murder,
radical repudiation of the social pact that disempowers him.10 Invisibility translates here as a
humiliating impotence within a bureaucratized culture’s identity norms, and Dostoevsky’s next
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hero, Raskolnikov, even more pinched and beleaguered, launches with his murderous act the
novel that the subsequent ones I’m exploring could be named: Crime and Punishment.
Dostoevsky’s philosophic murder enters Faulkner’s American canvas as a race murder. It is
race—rather than any set of maverick ideas beyond traditional good and evil—that Light in
August knows to be most explosively invisible. Raskolnikov, scorning both the pieties of his
orthodox upbringing and the secular/bureaucratic assumptions of St. Petersburg, raging at his
fate as an insignificant intellectual misfit, aspires to Nietzschean revenge, a guiltfree murder.11
Joe Christmas, by contrast, wouldn’t recognize an iconoclastic idea if it hit him over the head:
what he will not, cannot, make sense of—what releases his acts of violence—is an incoherent
racial inheritance. Christmas himself is achingly visible (his parchment-colored skin is
abusively witnessed by all), but his racial identity is invisible, socially disappeared,
biologically unknowable. Faulkner creates him discontinuously, through a series of violent
scenes: beating Joe Brown in the early chapters, then the toothbrush-vomiting scene when the
dietitian calls him a “little nigger bastard,” followed by his adolescent beating of the black girl
in the shed, his being ritually beaten by McEachern over the catechism, his being beaten by
Max and the stranger at the end of his romance with Bobbie, and finally his beating Joanna
Burden during their foredoomed affair. The question of Joe’s invisible racial identity coils
within most of these scenes of assault; he can access his racial identity only as a violent
question. (When a prostitute fails to be scandalized by his announcement that he “is” black, he
nearly kills her; he requires repudiation to know himself.)
Deep identity in Light in August is perversely secured by such acts of passionate
aggression calling themselves “training.” In Christmas, Faulkner shows us a man who is
Calvinist in his behavior (“I had to do it,” he thinks before killing Joanna, “already in the past
tense” [280]) though believing in nothing, as well as a man who is black in the behavior
visited upon him (“nigger murderer” the town delights in labeling him), though he himself is
not culturally black nor is any biological basis for his racial identity knowable. The social
engine producing narratives of normative identity is thus stripped of legitimacy—its
knowledge base shown to be a patchwork of rumor or assumption—but it does not therefore
dismantle itself, it just becomes more lethally effective. The training imposed by social code
now passes outside the realm of conscious pedagogy altogether, moving automatically into the
muscles rather than engaging the brain, issuing in murderous behavior that requires no
foundation in articulable belief or demonstrable fact. Identity in Jefferson is lodged deeper
than thought, producing a community that—at its worst—assumes everything and interrogates
nothing. As Byron tells Hightower, “[Hines] knew somehow that the fellow [who called
himself Mexican] had nigger blood. Maybe the circus folks told him. I don’t know. He aint
never said how he found out, like that never made any difference. And I reckon it didn’t, after
the next night” (374). That is, by the next night, the fellow (Milly’s lover, also invisibly black)
is as dead as Joe will be by the end of the novel. In the oppressively racist world of Light in
August, no underground space exists in which the subject might be free of a culture’s lethally
polar predications; everyone must simply be white or black.12 Racial invisibility emerges as
worse than useless, enraging white folks in search of their tag and bringing down violence
upon the putative black man, producing in Joe a ceaseless sadomasochism that he would gladly
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trade in for peaceful self-acceptance.
All of Faulkner’s art is marshaled to give us the pathos of this undoing, for if we (like
everyone else) never learn who he racially “is,” we do learn—we alone learn—what it is like
to be Joe Christmas: Faulkner positions us overwhelmingly inside his sentient mind and nerves
during the first half of the novel. Reversing expected sequences, giving us effects before we
can fathom their causes, the form of Light in August patiently reveals the constructedness—the
ungivenness—of all forms of racial, gender, and religious conviction, even as it shows the
murderous insistence of a culture that cannot afford to interrogate its convictions.13 Modernist
constructedness is thus a far cry from postmodern randomness.14 The convictions represented
in Light in August may be startlingly arbitrary in the sense of ungrounded, but they are anything
but arbitrary in the consequences they unleash. Put otherwise, he is not Joe Christmas in a
sense, but Joe Christmas all the way. Though everyone inside the novel (including Joe) gets his
identity wrong, though there is no way in Faulkner’s 1930s South for anyone to get his identity
“right,” Joe Christmas has identity in surplus. “Horseshit. Nobody’s authentic,” Jacob Horner
proclaimed. Christmas, however—not that it does him any good—is authentic. Mangled and
mangling, abused and abusive, wounding others and finally crucified himself, Christmas’s
viciously acquired racial, gendered, and religious identity reveals the contradictory insistences
of an entire culture: this is exactly why he matters. The mounting tension between the peace he
inchoately seeks, inside, and the violence he suffers and is doomed in turn to inflict, outside,
fuels the entire novel—giving us not the weightlessness of postmodern absurdity but the gravity
of modernist tragedy.
A glimpse at the protagonists’ names may help to make the same point. Raskolnikov’s name
carries the word “transgression” within it, but no one in the text finds him therefore fated. (He
has a mother and a sister whose lives move along different emotional and ideological axes.
There are several ways of being Raskolnikov; it is almost a normal name, lightly predictive for
the reader but not compelling for the character.) At the other extreme is Jacob Horner. His
name means nothing to him—there is and can be no family of Horners—it merely exists as the
arbitrary word that others (including the reader) use to label him; it in no way serves to anchor
his being or communalize his options. So far, Dostoevsky’s realism and Barth’s
postmodernism; in between we have Faulkner’s modernism. Joe Christmas’s misnomer is no
less absurd than “in a sense” Jacob Horner: but Faulkner’s narrative loads this absurd name
with increasing significance. Joe’s name carries his entire past—not the family of Christmases
who might (like Raskolnikovs) have bestowed it but the drunken workers at the Memphis
orphanage who inflict the name as a bad joke on Christmas Eve, the scar of a name that
McEachern dislikes and will seek to alter but which Joe secretly maintains, the sign of a set of
inerasable memories and the portent of a doomed future. It is as unprivate, unserviceable,
unsustaining, as a name can be, one that can neither be lived into normatively (like
Raskolnikov) nor jettisoned like a no longer useful mask in a game one is no longer playing
(like Horner). The symbolic order in Light in August thus all but screams its dysfunction at us
in its way of allocating identity-narratives to its subjects. Yet Joe’s painful, touching way of
making that name his own ends by indissolubly fusing the polarity of “must matter” and “cant
matter” that energizes Faulknerian narrative—a time-soaked polarity that, separated out, would
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give us the simpler coherences of Raskolnikov on the one hand, and Horner on the other. I turn
now to Richard Wright.
Native Son appears eight years after Light in August as a sustained meditation upon both
that book and Crime and Punishment. Since I have made this sort of cross-cultural literary
claim more than once, I should acknowledge that, in a critical climate suffused with identity
politics and committed to materialist cultural studies, my insistence that a black writer’s text is
deeply affected by the work of two white writers (one of them a nineteenth-century Russian)
may seem offensively naive. I do not deny that it took a nightmarish childhood in racist
Mississippi to launch Richard Wright’s career, but that experience alone could not have
produced his voice. As Ralph Ellison said in another context, the “main source of any novel is
other novels; these constitute the culture of the form, and my loyalty to our group does nothing
to change that.”15 Wright, I want to argue, is thinking through Dostoevsky and Faulkner, as well
as the aggregate of his own cultural experience and imagination, when he composes Native
Son.
The reverse of Joe Christmas, however, Bigger Thomas has visible racial identity—it is all
people see—but he himself is not: his skin wholly conceals him. Faulkner’s text, focused on
his white culture’s fear of racial contamination, zeroes in on the hysterical effects of a racial
code when the visual cues it draws on to sustain its narratives are not forthcoming. Wright’s
text, however, focused on the deformity his culture has undergone at the hands of virulent white
racism, zeroes in on the invisibly deformed subject wearing his all too visible black mask. As
in Light in August, racial identity in Native Son may ultimately reduce to a set of convictions
that constrain behavior, but Bigger eventually learns—more interestingly than Joe—how to do
things with these convictions.16 Until then, though, the convictions and practices that constitute
the reality of race do things to him, things that seem to well up from his solar plexus through his
arms and mind: “Mixed images of violence ran like sand through his mind, dry and fast,
vanishing. He could stab Gus with his knife…. He could do a lot of things to Gus for making
him feel this way.”17 Like Faulkner, Wright positions the reader immovably inside his
protagonist’s sensorium—virtually in Bigger’s gut—and we as readers remain privy to his
knotted contortions. The cultural codes that sustain racism have trained Bigger’s mind by
tyrannically controlling the feel and deployment of his body. At Dalton’s house “He stood with
his knees slightly bent, his lips partly open, his shoulders stooped; and his eyes held a look that
went only to the surface of things. There was an organic conviction in him that this was the way
white folks wanted him to be when in their presence” (54). Organic: Joe Christmas, the
creation of a white author, is allowed to escape the race dimension of this awful organtraining
—in more senses than one Faulkner gives him a “white” body—but Bigger’s body is physical
inheritor of hundreds of years of fearful servitude. It is an unconsciously trained body, the
training begun long before Bigger’s birth. Thus when Jan and Mary seek to change his bodily
norms overnight (a naively arrogant move that precisely reveals their privilege), Wright
conveys Bigger’s bodily distress as these two white people cozy up next to him: “they made
him feel his black skin by just standing here looking at him, one holding his hand and the other
smiling. He felt he had no physical existence at all right then; he was something he hated, the
badge of shame which he knew was attached to a black skin” (76). “Organically,” like Joe

Christmas, Bigger feels his culturally imposed body-borders being transgressed—“the man” is
suffocating him—and he realizes, like Joe, that “something is going to happen to me.” His raceengineered body is going to explode.
Once it does explode, something unexpected happens, and here is where Native Son departs
from its parameters of Faulknerian doom. This apparently naturalist novel—the story of a man
destroyed by social forces he can neither understand nor resist—suddenly becomes briefly
postmodern. That is, it begins not only to foreground the linguistic but to see language as prior
to the scenes language launches.18Native Son starts to play with its culture’s differential
narratives for licensing identity. Trapped within the very citadel of patriarchal space—the
smothered girl’s bedroom inside the Dalton mansion—Bigger starts (perhaps for the first time
in his life) to reflect:
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And, after all, was not Jan a Red? … Fingerprints! He had read about them in magazines…. But suppose he told them that
he had come to get the trunk? That was it! The trunk! His fingerprints had a right to be here…. But there was still a better
way! Make them think that Jan did it. Reds’d do anything. Didn’t the papers say so? … If Mary were missing when they
got up, would they not think that she had already gone to Detroit? He…. Yes! He could, he could put her in the trunk! She
was small. Yes; put her in the trunk…. He stooped to put her in the trunk. Could he get her in? … He pushed her head into
a corner, but her legs were too long and would not go in…. [then after carrying her in the trunk down to the basement] He
stared at the furnace. He trembled with another idea. He—he could, he—he could put her, he could put her in the furnace.
He would burn her! That was the safest thing to do…. He had all but her shoulders in … her clothes were ablaze and
smoke was filling the interior…. He gripped her shoulders and pushed hard, but the body would not go any farther. He tried
again, but her head still remained out…. He got his knife from his pocket and opened it and stood by the furnace, looking at
Mary’s white throat. Could he do it? … Gently, he sawed the blade into the flesh and struck a bone. He gritted his teeth and
cut harder…. But the bone made it difficult…. He whacked harder, but the head would not come off…. He had to burn this
girl. With eyes glazed, with nerves tingling with excitement, he looked about the basement. He saw a hatchet. Yes! … He
… sent the blade of the hatchet into the bone of the throat with all the strength of his body. The head rolled off. (100–6,
emphases in original)

Bigger pulls off precisely the murder that Crime and Punishment is committed to make fail.
Seeking a stance beyond his culture’s imprisoning norms of good and evil, Raskolnikov
committed murder—only to find himself sinking into the torments of traditional guilt. His body
could not bear the consequences of what his rebellious mind had irresponsibly proposed. The
cautionary core of Dostoevsky’s novel centers on just this lawfulness lodged within the subject
at a level beneath thought. Bigger, however, rises into the freedom of amoral crime—a freedom
profoundly troubling in its gender configuration yet intoxicating in its liberation from a white
scenario of values.19 Dismembering Mary, once clear of biblical codes of judgment (codes
produced by and for “the man”), reduces to a hatchet job, an engineering problem. In a setting
suddenly departing from humanism and reduced to pure pragmatics, Mary is so much matter to
be disposed of. From this guiltless height Bigger assumes his own invisibility, resurveys the
entire scene (its race-saturated biases startlingly visible to him, as though highlighted by
ultraviolet), and he recognizes others’ systemic blindness: “The very manner in which [his
sister Vera] sat showed a fear so deep as to be an organic part of her” (122). “Organic”: the
word now characterizes behavior others take as nature but which Bigger decodes as training.
This newfound grasp of the racial narrative being performed serves as a skeleton key that
momentarily opens all doors.
He begins to manipulate, undetected, the part he earlier merely enacted. His “yessuh”
sounds no different but it has become artful; his culture’s repertory of scripts now cues—rather
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than suffocates—his “dumb nigger” agency. Communism, racism, the Leopold-Loeb case: these
once opaque phenomena now become so many miniature narratives he is able to deploy,
providing grist for his mill, motives for his gestures. He mixes and matches, making it up as he
goes—a Lévi-Straussian bricoleur before Derrida ever glossed the term. Wright shows all the
plays and players in this unfolding scenario to be scripted, but Bigger’s invisibility consists in
alone recognizing—and exploiting—the script he speaks. Not for a moment does he believe a
word of it; he has become “in a sense Bigger Thomas.” We are in the world of arbitrary
language games, and in the presence of a sort of negotiated freedom that Michel de Certeau
calls “tactics”: “The space of a tactic,” de Certeau writes, “is the space of the other. Thus it
must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power. It
does not have the means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight,
and self-collection: it is a maneuver … within enemy territory.”20 Bigger needed a hatchet to
take care of Mary, but all he needs is linguistic self-consciousness to handle Dalton and his
minions. Like Hawthorne’s Wakefield, Bigger thus becomes sublimely present at his own
absence, watching others not see him. Wright fiendishly stations him in the very guts of the
white master’s home—tender of its flame and visible keeper of its domestic viability, secret
murderer of its precious offspring. A successful Raskolnikov, a focused Joe Christmas, the
invisible Bigger exults in the drama of Mary’s corpse being only a few feet away from some of
the most powerful men in Chicago speculating on its whereabouts.
I’ve called these scenes postmodern, by which I mean that they enact an almost manic
release in Bigger’s performance of roles others take to be natural. All is script and pastiche
here; we are beyond the modernist longing for some authentic discourse uninflected by
ideology. And Bigger is beyond ideology.21 If for Dostoevsky the religious law has ceased to
compel intellectual assent, it remains precious and—stubbornly encoded in Raskolnikov’s
body regardless of his mind’s presumption—it ensures the transgressor’s defeat. If for
Faulkner the law has become racedeformed, a license for torture and murder when in the hands
of Hines or McEachern or Grimm, we yet continue to register (from an implicitly white
perspective) the gravity of social training, the tragic consequences of social training gone
wrong. Like Light in August, Native Son knows that the law is the law, and it will make its
protagonist die the death for his transgression, but it lets him briefly exercise his powers
(enjoy a tactical success) before doing so.
More, Wright reveals, as perhaps only a black writer could reveal—in the dark comedy of
Bigger’s violent release—a racial world suddenly emptied of justification and tonically
clarified. (Joe Christmas’s crime is never revelatory in this way, never anything but an
unavoidable mistake; Bigger’s crime is no mistake at all, but terrifyingly pedagogic.) As
linguistically limited as Joe, Bigger has yet learned to manipulate others’ speech, to maneuver
on their space, and to behave—nihilistically—as if there were no deeper purposes legitimizing
this drama, ordering its unfolding. Indeed, Bigger reads this Foucauldian power scene so
effectively that Wright is unable to provide any later justificatory narrative (including Max’s)
that Bigger will accept as a mirror for his own motives and behavior. Bigger cannot be
mirrored; the text can provide no ideological frame that might hold him within its focus. In this
protopostmodern novel everyone suddenly speaks only language. Awaiting his execution,
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Bigger remains not only invisible to others (his executioners think him a black beast while
even Max sees him as just a black victim), but opaque to himself as well, lacking any
conceptual schema that might turn his exalted moments of release into a new self-narrative.
“Only through the intersubjectivity of community can consciousness become selfconsciousness,” Houston Baker says of the absence of epiphany here.22 There are no others on
this stage whom Bigger might recognize as potential extensions of himself, in whose company
he might verbally reaccess himself. Instead, “he smiled a faint, wry, bitter smile. He heard the
ring of steel against steel as a far door clanged shut” (502). On this implacable note Native
Son ends.
Wright’s “The Man Who Lived Underground” serves as the obvious segue between Native
Son and Invisible Man. The postmodern elements glimpsed in Native Son are here more fully
displayed; once again Dostoevsky gives Wright his cue. On the run from the cops for a murder
he didn’t commit, Fred Daniels goes literally underground, diving into a sewer. Become
invisible himself, Daniels is now permitted to see everything. His sewer (no longer
malodorous, transformed into a place of promise rather than of excretion) becomes a sort of
Deleuzian rhizome, a line of escape underlying (and opening into) all the institutions of the city
above ground (church, movie house, morgue, typing office, butcher shop, etc.). It is as though
Wright had taken Bigger’s furnace scenario of Native Son and made it movable. The earlier
text’s concealment transforms into the later text’s mobility. To use de Certeau’s terms, a
tactical invisibility (confined to the enemy’s territory) opens into a strategic invisibility
(command of a new space liberated from the enemy’s control).
A limitlessly networked Daniels outdoes not only Bigger Thomas but Robinson Crusoe in
his capacity to gather up a culture’s entire arsenal of goods. But Wright has Daniels do with
those purloined goods what no realist novelist like Defoe could imagine: Daniels undoes their
symbolic exchange value and recodes them as material objects of play. Light bulbs, paper
money, guns with cartridges, diamonds: all of these are spread out and rearranged in Daniels’s
underground lair, regaining their original innocence, cleansed of their capitalist function as
items men once competed for. This Utopian fantasy of a play-space—this deliberate
infantilizing of capitalism’s motives and objects that hold adults in thrall above—cannot elude
the consequences of past time forever, and Daniels eventually chooses to exit from his
underground kingdom of invisibility, suicidally confessing to the same cops who originally
chased him. In an uncanny echo of both Raskolnikov and Christmas, Daniels thinks: “Why was
this sense of guilt so seemingly innate, so easy to come by, to think, to feel, so verily physical?
It seemed that when one felt this guilt one was retracing in one’s feelings a faint pattern
designed long before … but which had been forgotten by the conscious mind, creating in one’s
life a state of eternal anxiety.”23 Ultimately, the white man’s guilt-centered law recaptures him,
instilling its anxieties, and the black man relinquishes his interlude of invisibility, moves to
accept his doom. In both these texts, then, the inevitable execution of a black man (recalling the
race logic of Light in August) is only interrupted, played with, briefly reconceived outside the
law-supported necessity of racist annihilation. These are the hints that Ellison drew on to
compose the jewel in this crown of invisibility I have been analyzing.
Rewriting Fred Daniels’s underground sewer, Ellison’s Invisible Man opens in a

Certeauvian play-space, replete with 1369 lights tactically “borrowed” from and operated by
Monopolated Light and Power. The fact that “the man” monopolizes all the space above
launches Ellison’s postmodern revision of Dostoevskian and Faulknerian invisibility. Just as
invisibility is mainly a defect in Notes from Underground and Light in August (it launches no
new models of selfhood, provides no landscape beyond the reach of hegemonic norms), it
remains here—at the level of plot and theme—pure liability, the motif of victimization. But
Ellison turns invisibility, at the same time, into an extraordinary formal resource. Invisible
Man is not only unseen by others, his body is unseen by the text, and therefore unseen by the
reader. Such furnishing of invisibility subtly turns the abuse that lodges in this novel’s plot into
the privilege that nourishes its narrative procedure, its way of producing its elusive,
anonymous protagonist. Freed (so to speak) of a finite and penetrable body, immune to lasting
bodily pain, he is allowed to become for the reader a mobile and inexhaustible repository of
“soul.”24 As Ellison wrote in “What America Would Be Like Without Blacks”:
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Without the presence of Negro American style, our jokes, our tall tales, even our sports would be lacking in the sudden
turns, the shocks, the swift changes of pace (all jazz-shaped) that serve to remind us that the world is ever unexplored, and
that while a complete mastery of life is mere illusion, the real secret of the game is to make life swing. It is the ability to
articulate this tragiccomic attitude toward life that explains much of the mysterious power and attractiveness of that quality
of Negro American style known as “soul.”25

Invisible Man pulses with the insouciance of such articulated “soul.” The memorable
scenes in the novel are hallucinatorily written, with the narrator somehow adroitly detached
even while technically present—immured yet uncaught. Beginning with the Battle Royal, then
going on to the hypnotic Trueblood monologue and the manic scene at the Golden Day,
followed by the extraordinary explosions at the Liberty Paints factory and the subsequent
hospital scene, this book stages a set of carnivalistic tours de force—birthings and testings—
that exceed anyone’s sense of statistical reality, of what can happen to any single, embodied
player. Few of these scandalous encounters would have their tonic effect, though, without a
sort of comic-book bodily immunity on the part of the narrator. Even the Battle Royal and the
hospital scenes (the ones where the most physical violence comes his way) are bathed in an
unbruised narrational poise that allows supreme lucidity. He is never tired for long; he can’t be
kept down; his experience never damagingly entangles him. But we don’t watch him anyway
(we can’t see him): we watch instead what he hallucinatorily narrates for us to see. That is, he
performs at all times (and not only during the set speeches) as an orator, seducing most
tellingly not his plotted audience but his myriad reader. This is seduction shorn of mastery,
lucidity without omniscience—mastery and omniscience are “illusions”—but the secret is “to
make life swing,” and Ellison’s narrator swings. All eyes and thought and forward-moving
ambition (kept clear by Ellison of love or hate relations that might articulate his bodiness, halt
his trajectory, and reveal his personal dimensionality), Invisible Man enacts a journey that
stages instead the absurdity of institutional America.
“Play the game but don’t believe in it,”26 the Golden Day vet advises him, and though he
may not catch up to this advice until many disillusionments later, its mix of naive investment
and ironic detachment continuously enriches the texture of Ellison’s narrative voice. Like
Bigger momentarily, like Fred Daniels when underground, Invisible Man learns to play the
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prejudicial language games that play him. “I rapes real good when I’m drunk” (521), he
assures Sybil, and this tactical exploitation of the stereotype he knows he embodies for others
—this use of his invisibility—is almost wholly outside Joe Christmas’s range. (Christmas,
lacking any sense for how to manage racial prejudice except through violence, does rape, and
not just when drunk.) Invisible Man adroitly talks his way out of almost every dilemma that
entraps him. His wit and detachment—subtly abetted by bodily invisibility—grant him a
sidestepping resourcefulness outside the range of Faulkner’s and Wright’s less vocal and more
exposed, more finite protagonists. More than just a capacity to manage “the sudden turns, the
shocks, the swift changes of pace,” such adaptability on the part of his protagonist allows
Ellison to reprise earlier fictional dilemmas and make them speak their larger-than-life
potential: Bigger’s crowded family scene blossoms into Trueblood’s domestic scandal, Bigger
and Gus’s J. P. Morgan riff manically escalates into the Golden Day’s General Pershing
extravaganza. At its extreme such metamorphic flexibility in this novel takes on the name of
Rinehart. An almost mythic figure, Rinehard supremely embodies (but that’s not the right verb)
the elasticity I’ve been describing in Invisible Man. You cannot see Rinehart; you only see his
racial insignia—his dark glasses, his white hat—and these allow him to function in all the
games he undertakes: runner, preacher, gambler, lover. He is the ultimate in unsanctioned
performativity, in depthless simulacra: “And sitting there trembling I caught a brief glimpse of
the possibilities posed by Rinehart’s multiple personalities and turned away” (499).
“Turned away”: I want to start to close this talk by suggesting why Ellison’s novel turns
away from its own postmodern investment in identity as simulacra, feigned and
useful/discardable entities. The main reason lodges deep in the novel’s political imagination.
The ever-mobile Rinehart—lacking any core—carries no political promise, the static Ras the
Destroyer—arrested on his single core-idea—promises only violence. In between, however, is
the politics of race hauntingly voiced by Invisible Man himself. The Saul-become-Paul moment
occurs when he wanders into the Harlem scene of eviction. Contingent wandering here
catalyzes essential vocation, as he watches an old black couple being turned out, their lifetime
possessions cast into the street: a portrait of them when young, a pair of “knocking bones,” pots
of plants, a straightening comb, a faded tintype of Abraham Lincoln, some cracked pieces of
china, a folded lace fan, an old breast pump…. Hearing the old woman sob, registering it like
the child who sees “the tears of its parents…. I turned away, feeling myself being drawn to the
old couple by a warm, dark, rising whirlpool of emotion which I feared” (270). At this point
he launches into his song/sermon of dispossession, a self-authenticating speech that takes these
“evicted” items and reattaches them to the historical narrative that supplies their human
meaning. The political resonance of that time-soaked narrative—its locating of objects within
an overwhelmingly coherent racial history—is exactly the reverse of postmodern amnesia and
its array of verbal signs emptied of reference, carrying only exchange value. Here is
Baudrillard on the postmodern semiotic event: “At the limit of an always increasing
elimination of references and finalities, an ever increasing loss of resemblances and
designations, we find the digital and programmatic sign, whose ‘value’ is purely tactical”—a
far cry from the sign as “bound, impregnated, and heavy with connotation” (22), the sign as
metonymic reminder of a shared racial past.27
Ellison’s novel achieves its surreal elasticity precisely by bypassing its protagonist’s finite
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and embodied racial past. Apart from his grandfather he is without family connections; almost
no experience seems to come earlier (or lodge deeper) than his college years. He has little
unconscious life, few memories that believe before knowing remembers. Yet this novel draws
decisively on the larger race history in which, all along, he involuntarily participates. (Here is
his deepest difference from both Joe Christmas and Bigger Thomas, the one simply lacking in a
race history—Faulkner could not supply it—the other seeking to escape a race history he
registers as pure deformation.) However Invisible Man may try to soar beyond himself, body
and past magically transcended, he remains inextricably race-oriented. His brotherhood
speeches succeed only insofar as they sound this bass note of racial inheritance and
dispossession.28 Like a rhythmic undercurrent, this novel intimates the larger history of black
bondage and freedom through its deployment of vivid, time-saturated, race-imbued items: Tod
Clifton’s Sambo doll, Tarp’s leg shackle, the resonance of yams and chittelings, the snatches
and “echoes of blues-toned laughter” (xvi). The narrator may seem deathless (bodiless,
invisible), but his alter-ego, Tod Clifton, is not. Ellison reminds us that Tod’s name signals
death (in German), and Tod’s massive funeral ceremony releases into articulation the long
history of blacks cut down in their promise. Here, in in the rise and fall of this intensely
described, poignantly finite, black body, Ellison returns to the pain of racial visibility that
attaches American blacks to their ongoing history on these shores. In thus joining Faulkner and
Wright in acknowledging a racial injustice that concludes in murder rather than hibernation,
Ellison concedes the disfiguring power of the gaze, the injustice it has long caused and still
causes—all this as necessarily prelude to the liberating politics such shared and testimonial
suffering may yet launch.
Jacob Horner may be himself only “in a sense,” but that novel too closes on the death of
Rennie Morgan. We may not be ourselves for sure, but our bodies do surely become
extinguished in time. My first-person plural pronoun is appropriately all-inclusive, yet can it
be an accident that the desire to escape such extinction—a desire that underwrites the very
trope of invisibility—attaches so readily to male protagonists? That it is especially males who
seek to run, fly, and flee the fixing, finite-making, yet also communal gaze of the other: the gaze
that makes you seen? Rennie Morgan is visible to a fault, so are Joanna Burden in Light in
August and Bessie Mears in Native Son. Not only are all three of these women condemned by
their texts to death, two of their deaths suggestively revolve about the phenomenon of
pregnancy. Is the fact that each of us traces in our altering body a single, unrepeatable existence
on earth a condition males never tire of imaginatively transcending, even as this condition
registers so differently in the pregnant woman’s body, a site that conjoins—simultaneously and
unbearably—the realities of generativity, penetrability, and extinction? Is the fact, likewise,
that these are among the loneliest narratives in American literature—hypnotic stories of
invisible men who register the otherness of the social as shock and wound rather than
awakening and possibility—is this cherishing of privacy better seen as a resource to be tapped
or a neurosis to be analyzed?
Indeed, the functioning of social reality itself is premised upon visibility—to others and,
reciprocally, to oneself as well. As John McGowan puts it in his study of postmodernism, “Just
as the self is recognized by the community as a member of that group who occupies a certain
position and possesses certain abilities, so the self must recognize the individual recognized by
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the group as himself” (246). From underground man to invisible man: here precisely is the cost
of invisibility, the cultural price that nonrecognition imposes, the isolation it both suffers from
and seeks out. Richard Rorty tends to find such nonreciprocity productively liberating: the
postmodern ironist, he writes, “is not in the business of supplying himself and his fellow
ironists with a method, a platform, or a rationale. He is just doing the same thing all ironists do
—attempting autonomy” (97). Autonomy, yes, but didn’t Faulkner’s ironical Mr. Compson seek
out the same value, imagining himself as socially invisible and betraying the responsibilities of
community in the same way? It may be Levinas rather than Barthes who best points us to the
requirement that we be visible—recognizable to, answerable for, the array of others who
necessarily constitute our scene. As Edith Wyschogrod (a writer deeply influenced by Levinas)
claims, “It is the vulnerability of the other that challenges the structure of the self as an egology.
When the other appears she does not emerge as an object in the world or even a person … but
as a proscriptive moral datum. Coordinate with her sheer existence, built into it as it were, is
her vulnerability which acts as a solicitation and a proscription: ‘Do not injure me.’”29
“Do not injure me”: to what extent do the invisible men in the texts I’ve examined exercise
an “egology” perilously restricted to the first-personal singular pronoun, and disturbingly
liable to the injuring of others—especially women—in their pursuit of autonomy? Such
questions go further than I can take them, but I could not relinquish this musing on invisibility
without at least suggesting the profound uninnocence of the trope. Be that as it may, I began
with one postmodernist, Barth, on the ruse of “not being there,” and I conclude with another
postmodernist, Rushdie, on the stakes of “being there.” As Rushdie beautifully puts it in The
Satanic Verses, “The world is the place we prove real by dying in it.”30 Faulkner, Wright, and
Ellison (good modernists all) would not have worded it that way, but their imagination of race
finds the world proved real for kindred reasons. Without the concomitant reality of others
irrevocably related to us, vulnerable to pain and ultimately to death—as we are—the
individual trajectory would have little resonance, its autonomy be of little value. All three
writers compel our attention insofar as they honor the gravity of our group-shared yet
unrepeatable passage, the ultimate cost and value of our inhabiting bodies that remain—
however misrecognized—visible in space and extensive in time.
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